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Abstract
Using an overlapping generations model, this paper describes interactions
between naı¨ve and sophisticated hyperbolic discounters in general equilib-
rium. The naı¨fs, who overestimate their future propensity to save and hence
over-forecast the future equilibrium asset prices, are exploited through capital
transactions by sophisticates, who correctly forecast the future asset prices by
incorporating the naı¨fs’ mis-forecasts. Due to the capital losses, the naı¨fs fall
into bankruptcy when they are highly present-biased, highly patient, and hav-
ing a low population density. Under generous conditions, the equilibrium is
shown to be globally stable and Pareto inefficient in the ex-post sense.
Keywords: Bankruptcy; Hyperbolic discounting; Naı¨f; Sophisticate; General
equilibrium.
JEL classification? D51, D91
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1 Introduction
The self-control problem under hyperbolic discounting produces suboptimal sav-
ing/consumption behavior (e.g., Krusell et al., 2002; Laibson, 1997). In the context
of general equilibrium, it would not be the whole story. Naı¨ve hyperbolic dis-
counters, who are not aware of their own self-control problem, will overestimate
the economy’s future propensity to save and hence future asset returns. Sophisti-
cates, who are aware of the effect of the self-control problem, will lend to naı¨fs at
high interest rates that equal overestimated future returns on assets.1 By using the
borrowed money, naı¨fs buy less profitable assets than they expect. From the trans-
actions, sophisticates would obtain excess returns, whereas naı¨fs would suffer cap-
ital losses and possibly fall into bankruptcy, as casually observed in the unsecured
consumer loan markets. A comprehensive understanding of such naı¨f-sophisticate
interactions requires dynamic general equilibrium analysis.
This is the first study to analyze dynamic general equilibrium with interac-
tions between naı¨ve and sophisticated hyperbolic consumers.2 By solving the gen-
eral equilibrium system in an overlapping generations model, I obtain equilibrium
price dynamics in a closed form. The equilibrium is then characterized in terms
of unique existence, global stability, and Pareto inefficiency. It is shown that the
naı¨f-sophisticate interaction that is conjectured at the outset is indeed supported as
equilibrium phenomena.
In this equilibrium, naı¨fs’ mis-forecasting plays a critical role. Naı¨ve hyperbolic
consumers overestimate the economy’s future propensity to save and hence future
asset returns even if their expectations are consistent with the (believed) structure of
the economy. The naı¨fs’ expectation errors produce excess returns for sophisticates
1Definitions of naı¨fs and sophisticates originate from O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
2An overlapping generations model of a dynamic economy inhabited by sophisticates is analyzed
by many studies (e.g., Barro, 1999; Krusell et al., 2002; Sorger, 2007).
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and capital loss for naı¨fs. This equilibrium exploitation process is shown by first
solving the naı¨fs’ expectation dynamics and substituting the result into the general
equilibrium system.
The equilibrium with the naı¨fs’ mis-forecasting has a couple of unique proper-
ties. First, the steady-state interest rate on non-dividend assets is higher than the
population growth rate (zero in this paper). This contrasts with the case of the
standard monetary overlapping generations model, in which the steady-state inter-
est rate equals the population growth rate (see, e.g., Samuelson, 1958, and Tirole,
1985).
Second, present bias affects portfolio selection. In particular, naı¨fs’ portfolios
are shown to differ from those of sophisticates. Previous studies of behavioral eco-
nomics show that present-bias does not affect portfolio selection (see, e.g., Luttmer
and Mariotti, 2003).
I find that in my model naı¨fs are likely to fall into bankruptcy (i) when the
degree of present-bias is high, and hence the naı¨fs overestimates the future asset
price seriously, (ii) when the sophisticate-naı¨f population ratio is high, and hence
each naı¨f borrows heavily from a number of sophisticate lenders, and (iii) when the
long-run discount factor is high, so that the present bias is serious.3
This research relates to the previous literature as follows. Gabrieli (2011) ana-
lyzes competitive equilibriums with hyperbolic consumers. He shows the important
result that in no equilibrium do naı¨fs have perfect foresight. However, he does not
analyze interactions of naı¨fs and sophisticates. My study challenges this problem.
Heidhues and Koszegi (2010) theoretically explain the relationship between naı¨fs
and sophisticates. Using contract theory, they show that naı¨fs are exploited by firms
in the credit market. In contrast, I show that in a general equilibrium naı¨fs suffer
3Meier and Sprenger (2010) empirically show that high present-biased individual have high
amounts of credit card debt.
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capital losses caused by borrowing at market interest rates higher than the asset
return.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The model is set up in
Section 2. In Section 3, I discuss a no-bankruptcy equilibrium. I clarify the pa-
rameter condition that determines whether naı¨fs fall into bankruptcy. Section 4
presents the debt adjustment method that underlies a bankruptcy economy and
presents a bankruptcy equilibrium. Section 5 shows that both the no-bankruptcy
and the bankruptcy economy are inefficient. Finally, the conclusions are presented
in Section 6.
2 Model
Consider an overlapping generations economy starting from t = 0. Consumers live
for three periods: young, middle-aged, and old. The population is constant and
normalized as one. Consumers are quasi-hyperbolic, and hence faced with the self-
control problem that the preference for a large reward with a long delay over a
smaller reward with a shorter delay will be reversed as time passes. Two types
of consumers coexist in this economy: sophisticates, who are aware of their self-
control problem and incorporate it into their decision making, and naı¨fs, who are
not aware of their self-control problem and, hence, do not incorporate the future
preference reversal into their decisions. The population ratio of sophisticates to
naı¨fs is m to one, implying that the population is m

(1+m) for sophisticates and
1

(1+m) for naı¨fs.
I assume one perishable consumption good c and one asset a, which consumers
cannot short. By considering the consumption good as a numeraire, I represent
the time-t asset price by pt . The asset is an outside asset, the total amount of
which equals a constant, A. Consumers can borrow and lend in the loan market
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at a competitive gross rate of interest, Rt . Let s denote the amount of lending, a
negative s indicating borrowing. Consumers are endowed with w units of the good
only when they are young.
Consumers’ intertemporal preferences are characterized by quasi-hyperbolic
discounting: the discount factor is given by a (β ;δ ) model, where δ 2 (0;1] rep-
resents the long-run discount factor and β 2 (0;1) represents present bias. Expo-
nential discounting is a special case in which beta equals one. Because of the dis-
counting feature, consumers are faced with the self-control problem in which they
have to regulate their lifetime behavior under time inconsistency. Let me formulate
the utility-maximization problems separately for sophisticates, who are cognizant
of the self-control problem, and for naı¨fs, who are not.
2.1 Sophisticates’ problem
Sophisticates solve their problem backwardly. First, with the net wealth at begin-
ning of the given mid-age, the consumers solve middle-aged problem. Second,
with the optimal behavior of their middle-aged selves being given, sophisticates
maximize the entire lifetime utility. For simplicity, I specify period utility by the
logarithmic function, and make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Sophisticates have perfect foresight.
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The middle-aged sophisticates’ problem (MSP) is described as follows:
max
cS;t;t+1;cS;t;t+2;sS;t;t+1;aS;t;t+1
lncS;t;t+1 +βδ lncS;t;t+2 (1)
s.t. cS;t;t+1 + sS;t;t+1 + pt+1aS;t;t+1  RtsS;t;t + pt+1aS;t;t ; (2)
cS;t;t+2  Rt+1sS;t+1 + pt+2aS;t;t+1; (3)
0 aS;t;t+1  A; (4)
sS;t;t ;aS;t;t given,
where cS;t;t+i represents the time t + i consumption of sophisticates in generation t,
etc.
Equations (2) and (3) represent flow budget constraints for the middle-aged and
the old, respectively. Equation (4) represents the short-sales constraint. I repre-
sent the optimal consumption as functions of sS;t;t , aS;t;t , i.e., cS;t;t+1
 
sS;t;t ;aS;t;t

,
cS;t;t+2
 
sS;t;t ;aS;t;t

.
Given the optimal solutions for their middle-aged and old selves, the young
sophisticates’ problem (YSP) is solved; that is,
max
cS;t;t ;sS;t;t ;aS;t;t
lncS;t;t+β
2
∑
i=1
δ i lncS;t;t+i
 
sS;t;t ;aS;t;t
 (5)
s.t. cS;t;t + sS;t;t + ptaS;t;t  w; (6)
0 aS;t;t  A; (7)
where (6) and (7) represent the budget and short-sale constraints, respectively.
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2.2 Naı¨fs’ problem
In contrast, naı¨fs in each period determine their current behavior by maximizing
their utility from the viewpoint of their current selves. As preference reversal takes
place from period to period, naı¨fs revise the consumption plans made in previous
periods.
Naive young consumers in period t solve their following problem (YNP) to
determine their current consumption and saving,
max
cN;t;t ;sN;t;t ;aN;t;t ;c
t;t
N;t;t+1;c
t;t
N;t;t+2;s
t;t
N;t;t+1;a
t;t
N;t;t+1
lncN;t;t +β
2
∑
i=1
δ i lnct;tN;t;t+i (8)
s.t. cN;t;t + sN;t;t + ptaN;t;t  w; (9)
c
t;t
N;t;t+1 + s
t;t
N;t;t+1 + p
t;t
t+1a
t;t
t;t+1  RtsN;t;t + pt;tt+1aN;t;t ; (10)
c
t;t
N;t;t+2  Rt;tt+1st;tN;t;t+1 + pt;tt+2at;tN;t;t+1; (11)
0 at;t  A; (12)
0 at;tN;t;t+1  A; (13)
where X t;t+i is the anticipated value of X , which generation-t naı¨fs hold in period
t + i, as indicated by the superscripts after X . The time t + i consumption of naı¨fs
in generation t is represented by cN;t;t+i, etc.
Equations (9) and (12) are the young naı¨fs’ flow budget and short-sale con-
straints, respectively. Equations (10) and (13) represent the anticipated flow budget
and short-sale constraints that the young naı¨fs expect their middle-aged to face in
the future; and (11) represents anticipated flow budget constraints that they expect
their old selves. I emphasize that the constraints are anticipated because the naı¨fs’
future behavior and future market prices will deviate from their previous anticipa-
tions due to mis-anticipation of future preferences.
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Given the previous savings, the following middle-aged naı¨fs’ problem (MNP)
is resolved in period t +1:
max
cN;t;t+1;sN;t;t+1;aN;t;t+1;c
t;t+1
N;t;t+2
lncN;t;t+1 +βδ lnct;t+1N;t;t+2 (14)
s.t. cN;t;t+1 + sN;t;t+1 + pt+1aN;t;t+1  Rtst;t + pt+1aN;t;t ; (15)
c
t;t+1
N;t;t+2  Rt+1sN;t;t+1 + pt;t+1t+2 aN;t;t+1; (16)
0 aN;t;t+1  A; (17)
sN;t;t ;aN;t;t given;
where (15) and (16) are the flow budget constraints for middle-aged naı¨fs and for
old naı¨fs, respectively. Equation (17) is the middle-aged naı¨fs’ short-sale constraint.
I specify the expectations of naı¨fs by the following two assumptions.
Assumption 2. Young naı¨fs form expectations based on the belief that all con-
sumers are naı¨fs:
c
t;t
S;t;t+1 = c
t;t
N;t;t+1;c
t;t
S;t+1;t+1 = c
t;t
N;t+1;t+1 = cN;t;t ; 8t 2 f0;1;2; :::g : (18)
Assumption 3. Middle-aged and old naı¨fs have perfect foresight:
c
t;t+1
N;t;t+2 = cN;t;t+2; p
t;t+1
t+2 = pt+2; 8t 2 f0;1;2; :::g : (19)
By Assumption 2, naı¨fs are assumed to form expectations consistent with the
model based on the misperception that the others consumers are naı¨ve, too.4 Be-
cause of the misperception, young naı¨fs overestimate their future propensity to save
4Gabrieli (2011) proves that there is no competitive equilibrium in an economy inhabited by
naı¨fs who have perfect foresight. Naı¨fs’ expectations in this model correspond to the concept of a
temporary competitive equilibrium in Gabrieli (2011).
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and hence future equilibrium asset prices. In contrast, by Assumption 1, sophisti-
cated consumers correctly anticipate future asset prices. It follows that, as I will
show later, young naı¨fs hold all assets in equilibrium.
By Assumption 3, naı¨fs are assumed to become sophisticated when middle-
aged, and be able to recognize which young consumers are naı¨ve. In this simpli-
fied setting, only the young generation includes naı¨fs, who mis-forecast the future.
Finding that newly born young naı¨fs overestimate future asset returns, middle-aged
consumers who were naı¨ve in the previous period but now have perfect foresight as
sophisticates sell all their assets to young naı¨fs. Under Assumptions 2 and 3, assets
are traded in this way between young naı¨fs and middle-aged former naı¨fs.
2.3 Market equilibrium
Market clearing conditions for loans and assets are described as follows:
1
1+m
(sN;t;t + sN;t 1;t)+
m
1+m
 
sS;t;t + sS;t 1;t

= 0; (20)
1
1+m
(aN;t;t +aN;t 1;t)+
m
1+m
 
aS;t;t +aS;t 1;t

= A; (21)
where, by Walras’ law, the goods market clears when the market equilibrium con-
ditions for loans and assets, (20) and (21), are met.
All consumers’ expectations are rational in that they are model-consistent. The
expectations of especially young naı¨fs’ should satisfy the conditions
1
1+m

s
t;t
N;t+1;t+1 + s
t;t
N;t;t+1

+
m
1+m

s
t;t
S;t+1;t+1 + s
t;t
S;t;t+1

= 0; (22)
1
1+m

a
t;t
N;t+1;t+1 +a
t;t
N;t;t+1

+
m
1+m

a
t;t
S;t+1;t+1 +a
t;t
S;t;t+1

= A: (23)
Note that, irrespective of model consistency, young naı¨fs’ expectations are biased
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due to their misperception (18).
The competitive equilibrium is a sequence of interest rates and the asset prices
fpt ;Rtg such that sophisticates first solve the MSP and then the YSP backwardly;
young naı¨fs solve their problem (YNP) and middle-aged naı¨fs theirs (YMP); the
markets for goods, assets, and loans clear; and young naı¨fs’ expectations satisfy
(22) and (23). The initial condition of the economy is given by the amounts of asset
holding and lending by generations -1 and -2
 
a j; 2; 1;s j; 2; 1;a j; 1; 1;s j; 1; 1

,
j = N;S.
3 No-bankruptcy equilibrium
I first focus on the no-bankruptcy equilibrium, in which no naı¨fs fall into bankruptcy.
Let me start with the assumption that no consumers fall into bankruptcy. Later, I
will show a necessary and sufficient condition parametrically for this assumption to
hold valid.
To characterize the equilibrium of the model, I guess that, in equilibrium, young
naı¨fs’ expected asset price for the next period, pt;tt+1, is higher than the actual asset
price for the same period, pt+1, because they incorrectly overestimate aggregate
saving. From the first-order condition, the resulting expected returns on the asset,
pt;tt+1

pt , should in turn equal the interest rate, Rt . These relations are summarized
as
Rt =
pt;tt+1
pt
>
pt+1
pt
; 8t 2 f0;1;2; :::g : (24)
With the return structure, sophisticates do not hold any asset, while middle-aged
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naı¨fs sell and young naı¨fs buy all assets. That is,
aS;t;t = aS;t 1;t = aN;t 1;t = 0;aN;t;t = A(1+m) ; 8t 2 f0;1;2; :::g : (25)
Note that this condition does not contradict each player’s optimality. For sophisti-
cates, the return inequality (24) does not violate their arbitrage condition because
they hold no asset and cannot sell short.
Note that although young naı¨fs can observe that the amount of sophisticates’
asset holdings differ from that of young naı¨fs’, this fact does not contradict As-
sumption 2, because holding assets is indifferent to lending.5 Moreover, I assume
that each young naı¨f holds the same amount of the asset, (1+m)A.
Insert Figure 1.
Figure 1 illustrates how a consumer exchanges the asset and contracts loans in
an equilibrium. Young naı¨fs buy all the assets A by paying ptA units of consump-
tion goods and borrowing sS;t 1;t , sS;t;t , and sN;t 1;t from middle-aged sophisticates,
young sophisticates, and middle-aged naı¨fs, respectively. Middle-aged naı¨fs sell all
assets to realize actual returns pt+1

pt and repay all loans paying interest rate Rt .
However, these transactions may bankrupt them since the interest rate is higher than
the actual asset returns.
Under the equilibrium returns (24) and asset holdings (25) structures, the opti-
mal behavior of each consumer can be obtained as follows. From the YSP, MSP,
and YNP, sophisticates’ consumption behavior and young naı¨fs’ optimal consump-
5The no-arbitrage condition ensures that Rt;tt+1 = p
t;t
t+2

pt;tt+1;8t 2 f0;1;2; :::g.
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tion plan must satisfy
cS;t;t = cN;t;t =
w
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (26)
cS;t;t+1 =
1+δ
1+βδ
βδRtw
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (27)
cS;t;t+2 =
β (1+δ )
1+βδ
βδ 2RtRt+1w
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (28)
c
t;t
N;t;t+1 =
βδRtw
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (29)
c
t;t
N;t;t+2 =
βδ 2RtRt;tt+1w
1+βδ +βδ 2 : (30)
Irrespective of the young naı¨fs’ overconfidence about their future patience, (26)
reveals, from the property of the logarithmic utility function, that the optimal con-
sumption of time-t young naı¨fs, cN;t;t , equals the young sophisticates’ consumption
cS;t;t at time t. From (27) and (29), young naı¨fs plan to consume less when middle-
aged than middle-aged sophisticates consume. However, from (28) and (30), young
naı¨fs do not necessarily plan to enjoy greater consumption when old than old so-
phisticates do because they mis-forecast that the expected interest is lower than the
actual, Rt;tt+1 < Rt+1. From the property of naı¨fs, this future consumption plan of
young naı¨fs will not be realized in either case. Far from it—their consumption
rates, when they are middle-aged and old, are lower than those of sophisticates, as
is shown below.
Middle-aged naı¨fs experience a lower asset price than they expected when young
and suffer capital losses when repaying their debt by selling assets. To show this
formally, substitute (9) and (24)–(26) into (15) and (16) to rewrite the budget con-
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straint of middle-aged naı¨fs as
cN;t;t+1 + sN;t;t+1  βδ (1+δ )wRt1+βδ +βδ 2   pt+1 (1+m)A
 
pt;tt+1
pt+1
 1
!
; (31)
cN;t;t+2  Rt+1sN;t;t+1; (32)
where the right-hand side of (31) represents the net wealth of middle-aged naı¨fs.
The second term, pt+1A(1+m)
  
pt;tt+1

pt+1
 1, represents the capital loss that
middle-aged naı¨fs suffer, which is proportionate to the nominal interest rate 
pt;tt+1

pt+1
  1.6 Note that, without the naı¨fs’ misperception about the future
saving propensity, the nominal interest rate, and hence the capital loss for middle-
aged naı¨fs, would be zero, as in the standard overlapping generations model (e.g.,
Samuelson, 1958; Tirole, 1985).
By incorporating constraints (31) and (32), middle-aged naı¨fs solve their prob-
lem (MNP) to obtain
cN;t;t+1 = cS;t;t+1  11+βδ pt+1A(1+m)
 
pt;tt+1
pt+1
 1
!
< cS;t;t+1; (33)
cN;t;t+1 = cS;t;t+2  βδRt+11+βδ pt+1A(1+m)
 
pt;tt+1
pt+1
 1
!
< cS;t;t+2: (34)
These solutions reveal that, unlike the previously planned consumption functions
(29) and (30), not only middle-aged naı¨fs but also old naı¨fs consume less than
contemporary sophisticates. This takes place due to the unexpected capital loss.
The expected and actual borrowing/lending behavior of the young and the middle-
aged (st;tN;t+1;t+1;st;tS;t+1;t+1;st;tN;t;t+1;st;tS;t;t+1;sN;t;t ;sS;t;t ;sN;t 1;t and sS;t 1;t) is obtained
6When asset A represents money, the gross rate of inflation equals pt

pt+1. The gross nominal
interest rate is obtained as the real interest rate, Rt = pt;tt+1

pt , times the inflation rate pt

pt+1, which
equals pt;tt+1

pt+1.
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by substituting their optimal consumption and asset holdings into the corresponding
budget constraints (see Appendix A). Under Assumption 2, the naı¨fs’ expectations
about the asset price are obtained by substituting the expected borrowing/lending
behavior and asset holdings of each consumer into (22) and (23) as
pt;tt+1 =
βδ (1+δ )wpt
(1+βδ +βδ 2)Apt  βδ 2w : (35)
The equilibrium solution is obtained by successively substituting the actual bor-
rowing/lending behavior and price expectations (35) into the market equilibrium
conditions (20) as
pt =
βδ (1+δ )w  1+βδ +βδ 2Apt 1 βδ 2w(1 β )
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A((1+βδ +βδ 2)Apt 1 βδ 2w) : (36)
The interest rate is obtained by dividing (35) by pt as
Rt =
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)Apt  βδ 2w : (37)
The following lemma ensures that the asset price and gross interest rate in equilib-
rium are positive.
Lemma 1. If no generation falls into bankruptcy, the asset price satisfies
pt >
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A ;
for all t.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Insert Figure 2.
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By setting pt = pt 1 in (36) and solving the resulting quadratic equation, I ob-
tain two possible solutions for the steady-state equilibrium price, as depicted by
points E and NE in Figure 2. However, I can verify that the lower price solution
(point NE) is not supported by equilibrium (see Appendix C). This implies that the
steady-state no-bankruptcy equilibrium is unique. I thus focus on the higher price
solution (E) as the equilibrium price from now on.
Recall that the equilibrium solution is obtained by guessing that the young naı¨fs’
expected asset price is higher than the actual price for the same period, as in (24),
and, therefore, that sophisticates do not hold any asset, middle-aged naı¨fs sell all
assets, and young naı¨fs buy all assets, as in (25). To check the validity of this
assumption, I take the difference between (35) and (36) to obtain
pt;tt+1  pt+1 =
β 2δ 3 (1+δ )w2 (1 β )
A(1+βδ +βδ 2)((1+βδ +βδ 2)Apt  βδ 2w) : (38)
From Lemma 1, this is indeed positive in equilibrium.
Letting p, p f , and R denote the steady-state values of pt , pt;tt+1, and Rt , the
steady-state equilibrium solution, which corresponds to point E in Figure 2, can be
obtained from (35), (36), and (37) as
p =
βδw
2(1+βδ +βδ 2)A

1+2δ +
p
1+4βδ (1+δ )

; (39)
p f =
βδ (1+δ )w

1+2δ +
p
1+4βδ (1+δ )

(1+βδ +βδ 2)A

1+
p
1+4βδ (1+δ )
 ; (40)
R =
2(1+δ )
1+
p
1+4βδ (1+δ ) > 1: (41)
As pointed out previously, the steady-state gross interest rate is larger than one,
unlike in the standard overlapping generations model, in which the nominal interest
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rate is zero.
The time-t equilibrium price is obtained by solving the autonomous nonlinear
difference equation (36). The detailed derivation is provided in Appendix C. For
a given initial price p0, it can be solved analytically and expressed in terms of the
steady-state value p as
pt =
(1+α)(p0  p)
( 1)t α t (1+α + γ (p0  p))  γ (p0  p)
+ p; (42)
where
α = 1+
1+2
p
1+4βδ (1+δ )
2βδ (1+δ ) ;
γ =
2
 
1+βδ +βδ 2A
βδw
p
1+4βδ (1+δ ) 1
 :
Equation (42) implies that the steady-state solution p is globally stable because
α > 1, so that pt converges toward p over time for any initial value satisfying the
assumption that no consumers fall into bankruptcy.
I now consider the assumption that no consumers fall into bankruptcy. The
necessary and sufficient condition under which middle-aged naı¨fs do not fall into
bankruptcy is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. In an equilibrium, no generation falls into bankruptcy if and only if
a j; 1; 1 > 
 
1+βδ +βδ 2A
βδ (1+δ )w s j; 1; 1; j = N;S; (43)
and
1+βδ
δ (1 β ) > m: (44)
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Proof. See Appendix D.
Equation (43) implies that middle-aged naı¨fs in the initial generation have positive
wealth; (44) implies that middle-aged naı¨fs have strictly positive wealth for t =
1;2; :::.
From this lemma, middle-aged naı¨fs are likely to fall into bankruptcy (i) when
the degree of present bias, 1
β , is high (ii) when the sophisticate-naı¨f population
ratio m is high, and (iii) when the long-run discount factor δ is high. Intuitively,
with a lower β , young naı¨fs overestimate future asset prices to a greater extent, and
suffer greater loss when they are middle-aged. A higher m implies a greater amount
of sophisticates’ arbitrage transactions and hence a higher possibility of bankruptcy
for the middle-aged.
The property that a higher δ is associated with a higher probability of
bankruptcy—i.e., (iii) above—is rather counter-intuitive because a higher δ im-
plies a higher saving rate. This takes place because, with a given beta, a higher
delta magnifies misperception of future discount factors, δ (1 β ), and hence leads
to greater future loss.
Recall that the no-bankruptcy equilibrium, which is consistent with the ini-
tial guess (24), is unique (see Figure 2). I can also show that a no-bankruptcy
equilibrium that contradicts (24) does not exist (see Appendix E). Therefore, a no-
bankruptcy equilibrium uniquely exists under conditions (43) and (44). The above
results regarding equilibrium dynamics are summarized as follows
Proposition 1. If a j; 1; 1 >  
 
1+βδ +βδ 2As j; 1; 1βδ (1+δ )w ( j = N;S)
and (1+βδ )δ (1 β )> m is satisfied,
(i) a no-bankruptcy equilibrium uniquely exists,
(ii) the steady-state solution p is globally stable.
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4 Bankruptcy equilibrium
Let me next consider the case
1+βδ
δ (1 β )  m; (45)
in which, from Lemma 2, middle-aged naı¨fs fall into bankruptcy. I also specify
the initial conditions for (aS; 1;0;sS; 1;0) to exclude the trivial case in which so-
phisticates in the initial generation do not fall into bankruptcy. To close the model,
I specify a debt adjustment method such that each sophisticate gets the amount
 pt+1aN;t;tsS;k;t

sN;t;t (k = t 1; t) from naı¨fs’ liquidated asset pt+1aN;t;t in pro-
portion to his credit share  sk;t

sN;t;t .
7
Since young naı¨fs do not know that they will fall into bankruptcy in the next
period, their behavior in this case is the same as described in (26) and (35) in Sec-
tion 3. In contrast, sophisticates know that young naı¨fs will fall into bankruptcy.
Regardless, sophisticates still have an incentive to lend to young naı¨fs if an effec-
tive interest rate, which is computed from the amounts paid back from bankrupts,
is higher than the rate of asset return. The effective interest rate for sophisticates is
given by
ρt   pt+1aN;t;t
sNt;t
: (46)
From the discussions, sophisticates’ budget constraints (2) and (3) are rewritten
7One such repayment system is a creditor meeting.
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as
cS;t;t+1 + sS;t;t+1 + pt+1aS;t;t+1  ρtsS;t;t + pt+1aS;t;t ; (47)
cS;t;t+2  ρt+1sS;t;t+1 + pt+2aS;t;t+1; (48)
where ρt and ρt+1 are given to sophisticates. The first terms on the right-hand sides
of (47) and (48) represent the repayments from the bankrupts. Each middle-aged
sophisticate maximizes (1) subject to the budget constraints (47) and (48) and the
short-sale constraint (4). The young sophisticates solve their YSP in turn, given the
resulting optimal behavior of their middle-aged and old selves.
As can easily be conjectured from the discussion in Section 3, an equilibrium
is characterized by the same equilibrium return and asset holding structures as (24)
and (25). Under these structures, I get the sophisticates’ optimal consumption by
replacing R with ρ in (26)–(28) as
cS;t;t =
w
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (49)
cS;t;t+1 =
1+δ
1+βδ
βδwρt
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (50)
cS;t;t+2 =
β (1+δ )
1+βδ
βδ 2ρtρt+1
1+βδ +βδ 2 : (51)
The equilibrium effective interest rate can be obtained by substituting (9), (25),
and (26) into (46) as
ρt =
 
1+βδ +βδ 2 pt+1 (1+m)A
(1+βδ +βδ 2) pt (1+m)A βδ (1+δ )w >
pt+1
pt
: (52)
This implies that the effective gross interest rate is indeed higher than the asset
return. Note that when m ! ∞, ρt ! pt+1

pt . That is, as the population share of
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sophisticates approaches one, the returns on lending and asset holding are equalized
as in the equilibrium of the economy inhabited only by sophisticates.
As shown in Appendix F, I can derive the equilibrium solution by noting
(cN;t 1;t ;aN;t 1;t ;sN;t 1;t) = 0; and substituting (49)–(52) and the other optimal so-
lutions into the market equilibrium conditions (20) as follows:
pt =
θ
 
(1+m)
 
1+βδ +βδ 2Apt 1 βδ (1+δ )w
(1+m)(1+βδ )(1+βδ +βδ 2)Apt 1  (1+(1+m)βδ )βδ (1+δ )w ;
(53)
where θ = βδ (1+βδ )(1+δ )w  1+βδ +βδ 2A. The following lemma en-
sures that (53) is positive.
Lemma 3. In bankruptcy equilibrium, if sophisticates in the initial generations do
not fall into bankruptcy, solution (53) satisfies
pt >
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A ;
for all t.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Therefore, under the trivial condition that initial-generation sophisticates do not fall
into bankruptcy, (45) ensures that solution (53) is positive and hence viable as an
equilibrium price.
Taking the difference between (37) and (52) and substituting (53) into the result
yield
Rt  ρt =
(δm(1 β )  (1+βδ )) 1+βδ +βδ 2ARt pt+1
βδ (1+βδ )(1+δ )((1+m)(1+βδ +βδ 2)Apt  βδ (1+δ )w) :
(54)
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From (45) and Lemma 3, this implies that Rt  ρt , where the equality holds if and
only if the equality holds in (45). To sum up, the relationships among the gross
interest rate, the effective gross interest rate, and the return of the asset are obtained
from (52) and (54) as
Rt =
pt;tt+1
pt
 ρt > pt+1pt ;
which implies that the expected asset price is higher than the actual asset price and,
hence, that (24) and (25) are indeed satisfied in this equilibrium.
Insert Figure 3.
By the same argument presented in Section 3, I can obtain a stable as well as
an unstable solution for the steady-state asset price. The unstable solution is not
supported by equilibrium. The stable steady-state solution is given by
p =
βδ (1+δ )w

2(1+m)(1+βδ ) m+p4βδm(1+m)(1+βδ )+m2
2(1+m)(1+βδ )(1+βδ +βδ 2)A :
(55)
As I did in Section 3, I can solve the autonomous nonlinear difference equation
(53) and show the unique existence and stability of the resulting equilibrium. From
Lemma 2, sophisticates in the initial generation do not fall into bankruptcy if and
only if their asset positions aS; 1; 1 and sS; 1; 1 satisfy
aS; 1; 1 > 
 
1+βδ +βδ 2A
βδ (1+δ )w sS; 1; 1;
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and hence the initial equilibrium price satisfies
p0 >
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A :
For any initial asset price that satisfies this condition, the solution to (53) gives the
unique equilibrium price that converges stably to the steady-state value (55). The
following proposition summarizes the above results regarding bankruptcy equilib-
rium dynamics.
Proposition 2. If aS; 1; 1 >  
 
1+βδ +βδ 2AsS; 1; 1βδ (1+δ )w and
(1+βδ )δ (1 β ) m are satisfied,
(i) a bankruptcy equilibrium uniquely exists, and
(ii) the steady-state solution p is globally stable.
5 Inefficiency in the steady state
To examine the allocation efficiency of the steady-state equilibrium, I first define
c j;1;c j;2, and c j;3 ( j = N;S) as the steady-state consumption of the young, middle-
aged, and old, respectively. I need an ex-post efficiency criterion because naı¨fs
experience unexpected capital losses, and hence ex-post welfare deterioration, when
they are middle-aged. Since sophisticates’ planned lifetime utility is realized, I
focus on the young naı¨fs’ ex-post, or experienced, lifetime utility
U = lncN;t;t +β
2
∑
i=1
δ i lncN;t;t+i;
where cN;t;t ;cN;t;t+1 and cN;t;t+2 denote actual consumption. The experienced life-
time utilities for old sophisticates and old naı¨fs are lncS;t 2;t and lncN;t 2;t , respec-
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tively; and the experienced lifetime utilities for young sophisticates, middle-aged
sophisticates, and middle-aged naı¨fs are the same form as (5), (1), and (14), respec-
tively. Here, the ex-post Pareto-efficient allocation is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (ex-post Pareto efficiency). A resource allocation is ex-post Pareto ef-
ficient if and only if there is no feasible allocation improving someone’s experienced
utility without harming another’s.
In my overlapping generations economy, the resource allocation of the steady-
state equilibrium is ex-post Pareto inefficient. To show this, consider that a paternal-
istic planner forces young naı¨fs to reduce ∆ units of steady-state consumption, and
thereby transfers ∆

(1+δ ) units from young to middle-aged naı¨fs, and δ∆

(1+δ )
units to old naı¨fs. For any ∆, the welfare of middle-aged and old naı¨fs is definitely
enhanced.
Moreover, if ∆ is small enough, young naı¨fs suffer marginal disutility from re-
ducing consumption, 1cN;1, and will enjoy time-discounted marginal utility from
increasing consumption in the future,
 βδ(1+δ ) 1cN;2 +δ 2cN;3. Note that
sophisticates’ consumption and lifetime utility do not change since naı¨fs’ saving
does not change, and thereby market prices do not change. Thus, if the total
marginal utility (TMU),  1cN;1 +  βδ(1+δ ) 1cN;2 +δ 2cN;3, is positive,
the allocation is ex-post Pareto inefficient. Indeed, in a bankruptcy economy, the
TMU approaches positive infinity, and in a no-bankruptcy economy, because of
(44), the TMU is always positive as follows:
TMU =
 
1+βδ +βδ 2(1 β )δ (2(1 β )(1+βδ )+mκ)
w(1+βδ  mδ (1 β ))κ > 0;
where κ = (δ +β +βδ )p1+4βδ (1+δ )+δ +β (1+δ )(1+4δ ).
Proposition 3. The allocation of resources in a steady state is ex-post Pareto inef-
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ficient either in a no-bankruptcy economy or in a bankruptcy economy.
Intuitively, they consume too much when young and, hence, too little thereafter
because of unexpected capital losses. Unexpected capital losses not only reduce
middle-aged naı¨fs’ wealth but also result in a divergence between young naı¨fs’ ac-
tual and optimal consumption.
6 Conclusion
I construct the model of a dynamic economy in which sophisticates exploit
naı¨fs through capital transactions. This paper shows three properties of the no-
bankruptcy/bankruptcy equilibrium in an economy: global dynamics and stability,
a bankruptcy condition, and ex-post Pareto inefficiency. These properties except
bankruptcy condition are largely preserved if the model is extended as follows: (i)
the asset yields d (> 0) units consumption in every period, and (ii) consumers must
consume at least c(> 0). The first extension does not affect the bankruptcy condi-
tion, whereas the second extension changes the condition to one depending on the
asset price. Thus, in the economy with the positive lower bound of the consump-
tion, an equilibrium moves back and forth between a no-bankruptcy equilibrium
and a bankruptcy equilibrium if the asset price oscillates widely.
It would be worth introducing partial naı¨fs, who recognize present bias but
not its degree, into this model from O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001). According to
Wong (2008), partial naı¨fs account for almost fifty percent of all samples, so this
device would be plausible. This device could be utilized to separate the degree of
misperception from the degree of present bias and to relax Assumptions 2 and 3.
Therefore, introducing partial naı¨fs into this model would be helpful to analyze a
variety of misperceptions and understand present bias.
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Finally, the potential applications of bankruptcy equilibriums abound since a
change in the debt adjustment method means a change in the bankruptcy equi-
librium. For example, a borrowing constraint is introduced into this model from
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Appendix A Borrowing/lending behavior
Under Assumption 2, the expected borrowing/lending behavior of the young and the
middle-aged is obtained by computing YNP. By substituting young naı¨fs’ optimal
consumption (26) and (30) into budget constraint (9) and (11), respectively, I have
s
t;t
N;t+1;t+1 + p
t;t
t+1a
t;t
N;t+1;t+1 =
βδ (1+δ )w
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (A.1)
s
t;t
S;t+1;t+1 + p
t;t
t+1a
t;t
S;t+1;t+1 =
βδ (1+δ )w
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (A.2)
s
t;t
N;t;t+1 + p
t;t
t+1a
t;t
N;t;t+1 =
βδ 2wRt
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (A.3)
s
t;t
S;t;t+1 + p
t;t
t+1a
t;t
S;t;t+1 =
βδ 2wRt
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (A.4)
where (A.1) is the generation-t young naı¨fs’ borrowing/lending behavior and (A.3)
is the borrowing/lending behavior of the expected generation-t middle-aged naı¨fs.
Note that (A.2) and (A.4) are similar in form to (A.1) and (A.3), respectively, since
c
i;i
S;i;i+1 = c
i;i
N;i;i+1;c
i;i
S;i+1;i+1 = c
i;i
N;i+1;i+1 by Assumption 2.
By successively substituting (25) and (26) into both (6) and (9), I have
sN;t;t + ptA(1+m) =
βδ (1+δ )w
1+βδ +βδ 2 ;
sS;t;t =
βδ (1+δ )w
1+βδ +βδ 2 ;
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respectively. Moreover, by successively substituting (25) and (28) into (3), I have
sN;t;t+1 =
βδ
1+βδ
βδ (1+δ )wRt
1+βδ +βδ 2  A(1+m)
 
pt;tt+1  pt+1

:
Similarly, by successively substituting (25) and (34) into (16), I also have
sS;t;t+1 =
β (1+δ )
1+βδ
βδ 2wRt
1+βδ +βδ 2 :
Appendix B Proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3
At time 0, the initial generations, -1 and 0, consume
c j; 1;0 =
1
1+βδ
 
s j; 1; 1 + p0a j; 1; 1

; j = N;S; (B.1)
c j;0;0 =
w
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; j = N;S; (B.2)
respectively. By substituting (B.1) and (B.2) into each budget constraint, I obtain
the borrowing/lending behavior of initial generations. The equilibrium solution is
obtained by substituting the borrowing/lending behavior into the market equilib-
rium conditions (20) as
p0 =
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A +
βδ  s j; 1; 1 + p0a j; 1; 1
(1+βδ )A : (B.3)
On the other hand, if generation -1 does not fall into bankruptcy, the following
inequality holds:
s j; 1; 1 + p0a j; 1; 1 > 0; j = N;S: (B.4)
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Using inequality (B.4), I can obtain the lower bound of the initial asset price
p0 >
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A : (B.5)
I now need to consider the asset price at time t. I rewrite the asset price (36) as
pt =
β 3δ 3(1+δ )w2
(1+βδ+βδ 2)2A2
pt 1  βδ 2w(1+βδ+βδ 2)A
+
βδ (1+δ )w
A(1+βδ +βδ 2) : (B.6)
Using (B.5) and (B.6), I can prove Lemma 1 by mathematical induction.
Next, I consider the case where middle-aged naı¨fs are bankrupts. Here, sN; 1;0 =
0, and the remainder is the same as above. With sN; 1;0 = 0, I have a minor change
in the equilibrium solution as follows:
p0 =
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A +
mβδ  sS; 1; 1 + p0aS; 1; 1
(1+m)(1+βδ )A : (B.7)
Since the initial generation -1 of sophisticates does not fall into bankruptcy, sS; 1; 1+
p0aS; 1; 1 > 0 holds. Using this inequality, the lower bound of the initial asset price
is given in a form similar to that of (B.5). Since I can rewrite the asset price (53) as
pt =
β 3δ 3(1+δ )2w2m
(1+βδ )(1+m)(1+βδ+βδ 2)2A2
pt 1  (1+(1+m)βδ )βδ (1+δ )w(1+m)(1+βδ )(1+βδ+βδ 2)A
+
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A ;
Lemma 3 is proved by mathematical induction.
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Appendix C Detailed derivation of nonlinear equation (36)
By setting pt = pt 1 = p in (36), I obtain the quadratic equation 
1+βδ +βδ 2A
βδw p
2  (1+2δ ) p+ βδ
2 (1+δ )w(1 β )
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A = 0:
This equation has two solutions. One of these solutions is (39), and the other is
given by
p  =
βδw
2(1+βδ +βδ 2)A

1+2δ  
p
1+4βδ (1+δ )

: (C.1)
This solution is not supported by equilibrium since (C.1) is lower than the lower
bound of the asset price; i.e., βδ (1+δ )w 1+βδ +βδ 2A > p . Thus, I focus
on the solution of the nonlinear equation by using the steady-state solution (39).
The system of nonlinear equation is given by
βδ 2wpt +βδ (1+δ )wpt 1
=
 
1+βδ +βδ 2Apt pt 1 + β 2δ 3 (1+δ )(1 β )w2
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A : (C.2)
I first add  p+ p to pt as follows:
βδ 2w(pt   p+ p)+βδ (1+δ )w(pt 1  p+ p)
=
 
1+βδ +βδ 2A(pt   p+ p)(pt 1  p+ p)+ β 2δ 3 (1+δ )(1 β )w2
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A :
(C.3)
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Using (C.2), I compute (C.3) to make teams, 1(pk  p) (k = t 1; t), as follows:  
1+βδ +βδ 2Ap βδ 2w
(pt 1  p) +
  
1+βδ +βδ 2Ap βδ (1+δ )w
(pt   p)
=
 
1+βδ +βδ 2A: (C.4)
Letting xt  1

(pt   p), I can express (C.4) as a system of linear first-order differ-
ence equations:
xt = αxt 1  γ ;
where
α =
 
1+βδ +βδ 2Ap+βδ 2w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)Ap βδ (1+δ )w ;
γ =
 
1+βδ +βδ 2A
(1+βδ +βδ 2)Ap βδ (1+δ )w :
Then, since the system of linear first-order difference equations can be solved, I
have
pt =
(1+α)(p0  p)
( 1)t α t (1+α + γ (p0  p))  γ (p0  p)
+ p:
Appendix D Proof of Lemma 2
Condition (43) is obtained from (B.4) and (B.5). In turn, I consider condition (44).
By successively substituting (37) and (38) into the right-hand side of (31), I obtain
β 2δ 2 (1+δ )w2 (1+βδ  mδ (1 β ))
(1+βδ +βδ 2)((1+βδ +βδ 2)Apt  βδ 2w) ; (D.1)
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where
 
1+βδ +βδ 2Apt   βδ 2w is positive from Lemma 1. Therefore, (D.1)
implies that young naı¨fs, except those of the initial-generation, do not fall into
bankruptcy if and only if (44) holds.
Appendix E Uniqueness of no-bankruptcy equilibrium
Although I focus on the case pt;tt+1 > pt+1 in the text, I need to show that the case
pt;tt+1  pt+1 does not exist.
Suppose that pt;tt+1  pt+1. I then have Rt = pt+1

pt . In this equilibrium, young
naı¨fs do not have any assets; and the others have all the assets. The expected asset
price is given by
pt;tt+1 =
βδ (1+δ )wpt
(1+βδ +βδ 2)Apt  βδ 2w : (E.1)
Note that (E.1) is the same as (35). I can, in turn, compute the future asset price
pt+1 =
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)A

1+
βδ
1+βδ
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)Apt  βδ 2w

: (E.2)
By mathematical induction, pt also ensures, from (B.5), (B.6), and (E.2), that
pt+1 > βδ (1+δ ) 1+βδ +βδ 2A. Finally, I take the difference between (E.1)
and (E.2) to obtain
pt+1  pt;tt+1 = 
βδ (1+δ )w
(1+βδ +βδ 2)Apt  βδ 2w
βδ 2w(1 β )
(1+βδ )(1+βδ +βδ 2)A < 0;
which contradicts the hypothesis pt;tt+1  pt+1. Therefore, I conclude that pt;tt+1 
pt+1 does not exist.
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Appendix F The bankruptcy equilibrium solution
Using the same argument as in Appendix A, I can also derive the borrowing/lending
behavior of sophisticates in bankruptcy equilibrium as follows:
sS;t;t =
βδ (1+δ )w
1+βδ +βδ 2 ; (F.1)
sS;t;t+1 =
β (1+δ )
1+βδ
βδ 2wρt
1+βδ +βδ 2 : (F.2)
Note that young naı¨fs’ saving is the same as (F.1) and the middle-aged naı¨fs’ saving
is zero. By substituting (F.1), (F.2), sN;t;t+1 = 0, and (52) into (20), I obtain (53).
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Figure 1: Asset transactions and loan contracts. The dashed arrows represent naı¨fs’
borrowing and the solid arrows represent naı¨fs’ repayment. The dot arrows repre-
sent asset transactions.
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pt
pt 10
E
NE
p0
Figure 2: Dynamics of asset price in no-bankruptcy equilibrium. The dashed lines
represent the asymptote of (36). The dotted line represents the lower bound of
the asset price. The upper-right intersection E is the stable steady state, and the
bottom left one NE is the unstable steady. The parameter is set at (β ;δ ;A;w) =
(0:9;0:9;1;6).
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0pt
pt 1
Figure 3: Dynamics of asset price in bankruptcy equilibrium. The solid curve repre-
sents the dynamics of asset price in bankruptcy equilibrium. In contrast, the dotted
curve represents the dynamics of asset price in a no-bankruptcy equilibrium. The
dashed lines represent the asymptote of (53). The dotted line represents the lower
bound of the asset price. The upper-right intersection is the stable steady state, and
the bottom left one, which is not visible in the graph, is the unstable steady state.
The parameter is set at (β ;δ ;A;w;m) = (0:9;0:9;1;6;100).
36
